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1. Anil Gupta distinguishes between thin and thick experiences. There are thick 
experiences like, say, the American Experience of a European traveler. And thin 
experiences like looking at a yellow coaster and then glancing at an orange one 
nearby. Thin experiences are short in duration and quite frequent in our 
ordinary perceptions of the world. The main purpose of Empiricism and 
Experience is to understand the rational contribution of thin experiences to 
knowledge: 
 
"The first step in understanding the epistemology of thick experiences is 
to understand the epistemology of such simple, thin, experiences. We 
need to understand the rational contribution of thin experiences to 
knowledge. This is the principal concern of this book. Hence, for much of 
the book, I use 'experience' to talk about thin experiences: experiences 
that are relatively short in duration and that occur in (but not only in) our 
simple, everyday perceptions of the world. I look at the yellow coaster 
and I glance at the orange one nearby. Here I have two visual 
experiences, each lasting a few seconds."2  
 
                                                
1 I would like to thank members of Phronesis Group, Logos Group, as well as participants 
in the   Workshop on Anil's Gupta 'Experience and Empiricism (ValenciaJune 20-22, 2006), for 
their comments on earlier versions of this paper. More specifically, the final version has 
benefited from remarks by   Manuel García-Carpintero, Tobies Grimaltos, José Martínez 
Fernández,  Carlos Moya, and Josep Ll. Prades.  
2  Gupta (2006), p. 225. 
There are in this respect two common assumptions which, as Gupta points out, 
appear to be in tension with one another: 
 
The Insight of Empiricism: "Experience is our principal authority and 
guide."3 and 
 
The Multiple-Factorizability of Experience: "Experience is a product of 
the world and of our selves. The subjective character of experience –how 
things seem to be in experience- is a product of two factors: how things 
are and our state and position in the world.”4 Let us call a pair of factors 
that result in experience -that is, a pair consisting of the state of the 
relevant part of the world and of the state/position of the self- a world-
self combination.... Any visual experience can result from several 
different world-self combinations. This feature is not peculiar to visual 
experience, of course; it applies also to other kinds of experiences..."5 
 
And, nevertheless, it seems that a satisfactory account of the Given, of the 
rational contribution of experience, ought to meet these two assumptions.6 
   
2. Classical Empiricism conceives of the Given as propositional and Gupta 
argues that this amounts to endorsing a Cartesian Conception of Experience,7 
                                                
3  Gupta (2006), p. 3. Sometimes Gupta presents IE as involving a stronger idea, namely: 
experience is not only our principal epistemic authority, but "the final authority on the validity 
of our beliefs"(Gupta (2006), 3, stress is mine). I am convinced that there is a relevant sense in 
which even this stronger claim may be recognized as true, but I have no room in this paper to 
motivate my claim. 
4  Gupta (2006), p. 5. 
5  Gupta (2006), p. 6. 
6  "The problem of empiricism and experience is to answer our initial question- What is 
the contribution of experience to knowledge?- and to answer it in a way that respects the Insight 
of Empiricism and the Multiple-Factorizability of Experience."(Gupta (2006), p. 11) The tension 
between these two principles can be expressed in rather general terms as follows: "If we could 
begin our inquiry into the world with a true conception of the self and the world then we should 
have no difficulty deriving truths from experience. On the other hand, if we could derive truths 
from experience, we could through successive approximations arrive at a true conception. The 
problem is that the beginning of our inquiry we have neither: neither a true conception nor a 
vociferous and truthful experience.... The problem is how to break into this circle?"(Gupta 
(2006), p. 10-11) 
7  "In summary, then, the propositional given forces one to a Cartesian conception of 
experience. It forces one to hold that the given is about the subjective realm and that a logical 
gulf exists between ordinary judgments of perception and the given in experience. Since there is 
little reason not to admit the propositional given once one accepts a Cartesian conception, we 
can formulate our conclusion thus: Cartesian conceptions are equivalent to the propositional 
which ends up either in idealism or in skepticism.8  So, an alternative account of 
the Given is needed if we wished to retain the Insight of Empiricism.  
 In particular, Gupta proposes to construe the Given as a function which 
takes us from experience e and view v to a perceptual judgment PJ. The rational 
contribution of a particular experience e is, thereby, fixed by a set of 
conditionals like this 
 
experience e in combination with view v.i entitles the agent holding v.i to 
make some perceptual judgments PJ.i.9 
 
In other words, we could say that there are a number of conditionals 
 
                (E)   e + v.i ---> PJ.i      
 
such that the rational contribution of a certain experience e is the set formed by 
all true E-conditionals involving that experience. We thus have a hypothetical 
conception of the Given (that is, conditional upon the different views) and not 
propositional. For the Given by experience e reduces to the truth of a certain 
function. 
 Gupta crucially complements this conception of the Given with an 
account of how we can go from the hypothetical to the categorical. He takes it 
that the convergence and stability of the results obtained by applying some 
revision rules upon our initial views and perceptual judgements, may eventually 
entitle us to make some categorical claims about the world.10 This way Gupta 
may skip the dilemma between idealism and skepticism where Classical 
Empiricism is trapped. 
                                                                                                                                          
given."(36) In my view, Gupta's argument in favour of the first conditional claim (i.e., 'the 
propositional given forces one to a Cartesian conception of experience') is unsound because it 
relies on some feature of experiences which Gupta claims to be independent of a Cartesian view, 
whereas I regard the way he understands those features as an expression of that view. 
8  "... Classical empiricism leads to either skepticism or idealism. In the former case, it is 
plain that the Insight [of Empiricism] is not preserved. The same holds in the latter case also, 
though this can be masked by phenomenalist constructions... The underlying motivation for the 
Insight comes from a moderately realist attitude towards the world. Once one accepts idealism, 
the Insight loses all motivation."(56) 
9  "The logical category of the contribution of experience is not that of proposition but 
that of function. Let e be an experience and let  e be the logical contribution of e –the given in 
e. Then the suggestion is that   e is a function that takes views v as input and yields classes of 
judgments  e (v) as output." (Gupta (2006), 79). 
10  Cf. Gupta (2006), cf. section 4B. 
 3.  I do not think that Gupta's functional conception of the Given can, as it 
stands, make sense of the rational contribution of experience. It needs to be 
complemented with an account of how experience e is to be individuated. In 
what follows, I will describe in some detail why such complement is required 
and the constraints that it must fulfill. A crucial constraint will go like this: e's 
individuating conditions ought to be relevantly independent of e's capacity to 
fulfill the function which, according to Gupta, constitutes its rational 
contribution. There is no hint in Empiricism and Experience of how Gupta's 
account of the Given could meet this constraint. Besides, I will argue that 
standard functional entities do satisfy this constraint, but the procedure to 
which we appeal in that case, is unavailable to Gupta's account. And it is hard to 
see how else that constraint could be satisfied, since, after all, he endorses a 
functional account of the Given. 
 Secondly, I will sketch an alternative (though not original) conception of 
the Given which avoids the previous concern,11 and comes up as both 
hypothetical and propositional. In my view, this alternative approach preserves 
the relevant intuitions lying behind the Insight of Empiricism and the Multi-
Factorizability of Experience, while avoiding the traps of both Classical 
Empiricism and Gupta's functional approach.  
  
II 
A Challenge to Gupta's Functional Approach to the Given 
 
4. Gupta regards the rational contribution of a thin experience e as constituted 
by a set of E-conditionals. Let us explore, however, the conditions under which a 
set of E-conditionals can determine the rational contribution of e. Consider, for 
instance, three incompatible sets of E-conditionals for experience e and a given 
view v, say 
 
Set S1     e + v ---->P J 
Set S2    e + v ---->PJ* 
                                                
11  My alternative conception is inspired in general views expressed in Brandom (1994, 
2000), McDowell (1996, 198a, 1998b), and Stroud (2000). 
Set S3     e + v---->PJ** 
 
which aim at fixing the rational contribution of e. We may legitimately raise the 
following question:   
 
[Q] In virtue of what does one of these sets, but not the others, pick up 
the rational contribution of e? 
 
At first sight, a reasonable response may go like this: in virtue of some features 
of e that render, say, set 1 true, and false the two other sets. 
 The legitimacy of the question Q becomes obvious as we recall that E-
conditionals must be normative, since they involve an entitlement relation and, 
therefore, must make room for error. An agent may actually generate S2 out of 
e and, yet, be mistaken. We can certainly make sense of this error if we assume 
that there are some features of e in virtue of which the agent is right or wrong 
or, in other words, some features of e in virtue of which a set of E-conditionals is 
true of it. And, needless to say, the fact involved in this 'in virtue of' relation can 
be expressed by a true proposition and, as a result, the Given appears as 
propositional, but not necessarily as categorical. For, as we shall see, the 
rational contribution of e might still be hypothetical. 
  
6. This answer to question Q is, nevertheless, unavailable to a non-propositional 
proposal like Gupta's. The issue now is whether he can still provide a reasonable 
answer to that question, that is, whether he can account for the fact that a 
particular set S1 of E-conditionals fixes the rational contribution of a certain 
experience e.  
 In Empiricism and Experience, there is no hint at how Gupta's proposal 
could meet this challenge. In what follows, I will show, firstly, why Gupta cannot 
escape this demand, that is, why question Q is a legitimate and indispensable 
question for his account of the Given and, secondly, I will describe the means by 
which standard functional properties meet the corresponding Q-question and 
explain why such means are unavailable to Gupta. To these purposes, I will 
draw a parallel between Gupta's proposal and dispositionalist theories of color. 
  
 7. Let us focus on the dispositionalist analysis of color properties that David 
Lewis proposes in ‘Naming colors’.12 His analysis is part of an attempt to deny 
that there are color properties in the world as it is  independently of us, and to 
approach them as response-dependent properties. Quite naturally, Lewis begins 
by characterizing both red and the experience of red as follows: 
 
(1) “Red is the surface property of things which typically causes 
experiences of red in people who have such things before the eyes. 
(2) Experience of red is the inner state of people which is the typical 
effect of having red things before the eyes.”13 
 
He quite straightforwardly acknowledges that this “pair of definitions are almost 
totally useless, by reason of circularity”.14 He also accepts that Carnap’s 
maneuver to avoid circularity in terms of a Ramsey sentence, is insufficient 
because it does not allow us to distinguish between red and yellow, and between 
the experience of red and the experience of yellow. To solve this problem, we 
need, as Lewis points out, some further claims like the following ones: 
 
(3) ‘Red is the color of pillar box’ 
(4) “... A living instrument: magenta is the color such that I am disposed 
to say ‘magenta’ if you point to it and ask ‘What color is that?’”15 
 
Lewis raises some worries concerning the parochialism of (3) which I will ignore 
here. Suppose then that 
 
the combination of facts (1), (2), and some (3)-like and (4)-like facts fix 
the properties red and experience of red. 
 
                                                
12  Cf. Lewis (1997). 
13  Lewis (1997), p. 327. I am leaving aside other worries as to how to express these 
biconditionals in such a way that they are true of colors and not of shapes. Cf., in this respect, 
Pettit (1991), Johnston (1989, 1992, 1993, 1998), Stroud (2000), Wedgwood (1998), and Wright 
(2001).  
14  Lewis (1997), p. 327. 
15  Lewis (1997), p. 336. Some materials in this section are drawn from Corbí (2004). 
Yet, the need to introduce (3)-like facts in order to distinguish between red and 
yellow, has some serious implications. 
 It seems clear that (3) is to be construed as an example of a red object 
whose role is to contribute to fixing the property which ‘red’ refers to. But let us 
consider the conditions under which (3) could play such a role. First of all, (3) 
involves the previous mastery of the concept of color: a pillar box can only help 
to fix the content of ‘red’ if the concept of ‘color’ has already been fixed. To be 
consistent, the dispositionalist ought to provide a response-dependent account 
of the concept of ‘color’ itself and it is uncertain how this could be done. 
Secondly, it is clear that if pillar boxes are to be used as examples that help us to 
grasp a certain concept (or to fix a certain property), then our capacity to grasp 
the color of a pillar box cannot be reduced to our capacity to grasp the truth (1) 
plus the claim that a pillar box satisfies the definition of ‘red’ in (1). For, as we 
have seen, this definition does not tell us whether the object is red or yellow, 
whereby if those are the only facts that we grasp, we are not yet grasping that a 
pillar box is red instead of yellow. The color of a pillar box can only be used as 
an example to fix the content of ‘red’ if, in grasping the color of that object, we 
grasp something more than its capacity to satisfy the disposition specified in (1). 
One could say that what we grasp when we are in front of a British pillar box is 
simply that it is red and not yellow. My point is that this fact cannot be 
apprehended by the response-dependent biconditional because, contrary to 
Lewis' purposes, such biconditionals only characterize color properties if they 
presuppose our capacity to grasp some independent facts like the ones I have 
just mentioned. And this seems enough to challenge a response-dependent 
approach to colors, insofar as such an approach claims that colors are merely 
response-dependent properties, namely, that the sense in which an object has a 
color is exhausted by (1). Let us now apply this line of reasoning to Gupta's 
functional account of the Given in experience.  
 
8. Consider a set S1 of E-conditionals and suppose that the Given in a particular 
experience e reduces to the truth of the E-conditionals in that set. My previous 
reflection suggests that some extra fact is needed in virtue of which S1 picks up 
the rational contribution of experience e and not that of experience e*. We may, 
indeed, point to a particular experience e as an example of the satisfaction of S 
in order to avoid the previous indeterminacy. But, it is clear that, in so doing, we 
must grasp something more than the mere fact that set S1 of E-conditionals is 
true of e. We must grasp some facts in virtue of which S1 is true of e.  For, 
otherwise, it is unclear how to point in a certain direction might help us to fix 
the particular experience we are talking about and, as a result, to provide an 
example of an experience having a specific set of E-conditionals as its rational 
contribution to knowledge. Yet, if there are some facts that distinguish 
experience e from experience e* and in virtue of which different sets of E-
conditionals are true of e and e*, then it is hard to see why they could not be 
propositionally stated. So, Gupta owes us a non-propositional account of why 
set S1 fixes the Given in experience e and not the Given in experience e*. 
Unfortunately, in Empiricism and Experience, there is no hint of what that 
account might look like. Let us now see how standard functional properties 





Standard Functional  Properties and Contextualism 
 
9.  A functional theory may characterize 'being a mouse' as a device of a certain 
kind. This functional theory will mention facts like 'if X is a mouse, then X 
allows you to move an arrow around the computer screen, click on some items 
and perform some functions of the program at stake,....'.  So, the functional 
property of 'being a mouse' is individuated in terms of some other functional 
properties. In general, a functional property f.i is individuated by its role in a 
theory T: 
  f.i  T(f.1.........f.n) 
 
Yet, this circularity is not vicious because, even though inputs and outputs 
cannot be individuated independently of any functional theory, they are 
individuated independently of the functional theory at stake. Inputs and outputs 
are often individuated in terms of lower-level functional theories, although in 
general, we can say that they participate in a variety of different functional 
theories, so that their identity does not solely depend on the circular definition 
provided by a certain functional theory. 
 This is a benefit that, as we have seen, dispositional accounts of color 
properties can hardly enjoy if they are supposed to remain within the narrow 
boundaries of subjectivism. By contrast, functional accounts of experience could 
take advantage of such standard procedure if they assumed that experiences 
have features that are individuated regardless of the satisfaction of a set S1 of E-
conditionals and in virtue of which such set is true of e. Yet, this strategy is 
unavailable to non-propositional accounts like Gupta's because, on this 
suggestion, the Given will become not only hypothetical, but propositional as 
well. 
 
10. A rather natural corollary of my previous considerations is that we needn't 
treat as bottom level the features in virtue of which an experience e makes a 
certain rational contribution to knowledge. In fact, no such assumption is in 
place in the individuation of standard functional properties, where only a 
network of multi-layer functional properties is required to individuate inputs 
and outputs independently of the functional theory at stake.   
 This brings to light a crucial assumption in Classical Empiricism, namely: 
that 
Bottom-Level Assumption: if there are some features in experience in 
virtue of which an experience e makes its rational contribution to 
knowledge, such features must be individuated independently of any 
views, that is, they must be bottom-level. 
 
Gupta seems to take this assumption for granted as he claims that the 
acceptance of a propositional Given leads us into either skepticism or idealism. 
Yet, if we give up the Bottom-Level Assumption and endorse a contextual 
approach to the individuation of the features of experience e in virtue of which 
this experience makes a certain contribution to knowledge, the traditional path 
to the dilemma between idealism and skepticism is avoided.16 The context here 
                                                
16  I am not thereby denying that another route towards such a dilemma could actually be 
elaborated. In fact, it has been deployed insofar as contextualism may be associated with some 
forms of relativism, but this is an issue whose discussion I cannot even sketch here. On the other 
will be mainly provided by the views in dispute on any particular occasion. 
Suppose, for instance, that agent A holds view v1 whereas agent B holds view v2 
and, when they are confronted with experience e, A makes perceptual judgment 
PJ and B makes perceptual judgment PJ*. We may, then, consider whether 
there are some features f in e such that 
 
e(f) + v1 -----> PJ   and  e(f) + v2 -----> PJ* 
 
To this purpose, we needn't assume that e(f) is picked up independently of any 
view. We may grant that the way we pick up e(f) is independent of the aspects in 
which v1 and v2 diverge, but its individuation may rely on some aspects on 
which they agree. On this approach, one must resist the temptation to think that 
there are some e(f) which is common to all possible divergent views.  
 It is unclear why Gupta is so reluctant to adopt a contextualist approach 
with regard this issue, given that, in Empiricism and Experience, he endorses a 
contextualist perspective with regard to other related issues, namely: logical 
form, perceptual judgment, direct awareness, and the crucial distinction 
between thick and thin experiences. Thus, Gupta insists that it does not make 
sense to talk, in abstract, of the logical form of a sentence, since the way the 
logical form is to be fixed depends on the interests guiding the analysis.17 
Similarly, he stresses that what counts as a perceptual judgment depends on the 
context. He explicitly claims that there is no way to peel away our views to leave 
just a pure perceptual judgment.18 Something similar happens with the ordinary 
phenomenon of direct awareness which, according to Gupta, is rather flexible as 
to the kind of entity we may be directly aware of. In fact, he claims that there is 
no privileged ontological kind such that we are only aware of entities of that 
                                                                                                                                          
hand, I should stress that contextual approach to the Given satisfies, in a rather trivial way, the 
four constraints on an account of experience specified by Gupta (cf. section 2B).  
17  "There is no level of 'the deep logical form'. We can analyze our sentences in different 
ways and there is no unique answer to the question of which of the analyses captures the deep 
logical form –at least, none that is independent of the functions that the analyses are meant to 
serve."(Gupta (2006), 132) 
18  "There is another point about perceptual judgments that is important to note: the 
demarcation of judgments that are perceptual is not absolute. The demarcation can shift as one 
shifts one's view. The shift can be large, as for example when we shift from our ordinary, 
commonsense view to a sense-datum view. The shift can be small and subtle, as for example 
when we shift from one ordinary view to another..... The shifting demarcation of the perceptual 
from the non-perceptual is not a problem for our account of the given. The account does not rest 
on a prior, absolute demarcation of the perceptual. It needs only a relative demarcation. "(84) 
(cf. 83-4). 
kind.19 And, finally, the distinction between thick and thin experiences sounds 
as a rather  contextual and relative notion. In particular, it is unclear whether we 
could make sense of an experience e as the thinnest experience taking place in a 
particular situation. In a similar vein, why not assume that what counts as the 
Given in an experience e is also contextually individuated, that is, relative to the 
views in dispute?  
 Part of Gupta's reluctance to endorse a contextualist approach to the 
Given in experience may derive from an understanding of the Insight of 
Empiricism as committed to the Bottom-Level Assumption. Needless to say, my 
remarks in this section may be construed as an initial step in the direction of 
calling such an understanding into question. One additional (and related) 
motivation for Gupta's reluctance may be his emphasis on convergence, which 
he regards as a crucial to step from hypothetical to categorical claims and, 
therefore, is conceived of as utterly non-contextual. I doubt, however, that this 
notion of convergence could be ultimately coherent with the Insight of 
Empiricism, but this is a central issue in Gupta's approach that I must leave for 
another occasion. 
  
11. To sum up, I have firstly argued that Gupta owes us an account of how his 
functional conception of the Given can answer question Q, namely: In virtue of 
what does one of these sets, but not the others, pick up the rational contribution 
of e?. Secondly, I have suggested why a non-propositional conception of the 
Given may not be able meet such a demand. And, thirdly, I have sketched a 
contextual answer to Q which sympathizes with Gupta's contextual approach to 
related issues and allow us to defend a hypothetical, but propositional 
conception of the Given. 
 
                                                
19  A striking feature of the ordinary phenomenon of direct awareness is its flexibility. At 
one moment, I can be directly aware of the stick in my hand. At another moment, I can focus on 
the feelings in my hand. And at yet another, I can be directly aware only of the unseen ball 
behind the dresser that I am trying to roll out with the stick. I seem to touch the ball directly, 
and the stick seems to become an unperceived part of me. The flexibility of direct awareness is 
essential to our ability to efficiently manipulate things in the world, and is of critical importance 
to our survival."(153) 
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